|Eliminating the Doha Round would stop talks concerning key topics, such as agriculture and manufacturing, between developing and developed countries [EPA]|
In a recent commentary, I drew on the Interim Report of the High-level Trade Experts Group, appointed by the governments of Britain, Germany, Indonesia, and Turkey, which I co-chair, to explain why concluding the World Trade Organisation’s ten-year-old Doha Round was important. The column was reprinted on a blog maintained by CUTS International (Consumer Unity and Trust Society), the most important developing-country NGO today, leading to an outpouring of reactions from trade experts. The faucet is still open, but the debate has already raised critiques that must be answered.
Some critics rushed in to declare that Doha was dead – indeed, that they, being smart, had already said so years ago. Presumably, our attempt at resurrecting it was pathetic and hopeless. But, if Doha was dead, one had to ask why the negotiators were still negotiating, and why nearly all G-20 leaders were still issuing endorsements of the talks each time they met.
Others argued that Doha was dead as negotiated. Or, in the words of former United States Trade Representative Susan Schwab, writing in Foreign Affairs, the Doha talks were “doomed” and ready for burial. However, these critics thought that one could pick at the corpse and salvage “Plan B”, though what was proposed in its many variants – always some minor fraction of the negotiated package to date – should more accurately be called Plan Z.
It sounded like a great idea: better something than nothing. But, in multi-faceted talks that straddle several different sectors (for example, agriculture, manufactures, and services) and diverse rules (such as anti-dumping and subsidies), countries have negotiated concessions with one another in various areas. Whatever balance of concessions has been achieved would unravel if we were to try to keep one set and let go of another.
Indeed, as Stuart Harbinson, a former special adviser to WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, has pointed out, the haggling over what should go into Plan B would be as animated and difficult as the haggling over how to complete the entire Doha package.
Some of the critics are factually ill-informed. The Bhagwati-Sutherland Report amply documents that much has already been agreed upon in all the major areas. As Lamy has put it, nearly 80 per cent of the curry is ready; we need only additional spices from the major players – India, the European Union, the US, Brazil, and China. These can be provided in politically palatable ways, which also means that the conclusion of Doha is within our reach, not beyond our grasp.
But why bother to continue trying? If Doha fails, some say, life will go on. That is true, of course, but that doesn’t make this view any less naive.
If the Doha Round fails, trade liberalisation would shift from the WTO to preferential trade agreements (PTAs), which are already spreading like an epidemic. But, if PTAs were the only game in town, the implicit constraint on trade barriers against third countries provided by the WTO’s Article 24, which is weak but real, would disappear altogether. The WTO stands on two legs: non-discriminatory trade liberalisation and uniform rule-making and enforcement. With the former eliminated, the most important institution of global free trade would be crippled.
This would also affect the leg that survived, because the PTAs would increasingly take over the functions of rule-making as well. This already can be seen in PTAs whose rules on conventional issues like anti-dumping are often discriminatory in favor of members. It is also reflected in the increasing number of non-trade-related provisions being inserted into the PTA treaties proposed by the US and EU, a result of self-serving lobbies that seek concessions by weaker trading partners, without which free trade supposedly would amount to “unfair trade”. These rules are then advertised as “avant garde”, implying that the PTAs are the “vanguard” of new rules.
As a result, the willingness of WTO members to invoke the Dispute Settlement Mechanism, the pride of the WTO – and, indeed, of international governance – would also be sapped. Tribunals established within PTAs would take over the business, leading to the atrophy, and eventual irrelevance, of the DSM.
We can live without the Doha Round, but for many people it would not be much of a life. Now is no time for cynical complacency.
Jagdish Bhagwati is university professor of Economics and Law at Columbia University and Senior Fellow in International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is currently Co-Chair of the UNCTAD Panel of Eminent Persons on “Development-centered Globalisation.”
A version of this article first appeared on Project Syndicate.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.