The causes of the uprising that has been rocking the Islamic Republic of Iran for a week now are unsurprisingly both structural and contingent. Initially kicked off by the economically dispossessed youth and joined by lower sections of the middle class, students and also some pensioners, it has reached an unprecedented geographical scope with protests spanning across 70 mainly smaller cities and towns in all four corners of the country. According to the authorities, 42,000 people, 90 percent of whom under the age of 25, have taken part, while the real number may be higher. They have been met by myriad methods of repression by the state’s security apparatus, leaving over 20 people dead (again merely an official figure), 1,000 jailed and an uncounted number injured.
Besides the structural factors that have been an almost constant feature of the Islamic Republic’s rule, the past months and weeks have added a new level of discontent with the regime as a whole, which led me to speculate the recent waves of protests “may only be a forerunner of more to come.”
The immediate trigger was a protest staged by Rouhani’s right-wing conservative opponents in Mashhad against the president’s economic performance that spiralled out of control. Then, like a wildfire, it ignited the entire country with a combination of social justice and anti-regime slogans. Yet, all this took place against the background of a wave of protests in the preceding months and weeks by workers, pensioners, teachers, and students.
Since March 2016, Iran has seen 1,700 social protests, according to the Islamic Revolution Devotees Society (Jamiyat-e Isargara-e Enqelab-e Eslami), a conservative party of which Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was a founding member. Over the course of 2017, hundreds of protests took place by workers, pensioners, teachers, and students. Labour protests continued due to unpaid salaries, neoliberal economic policies and resistance towards labour organising, which were confronted with harsh repression by security forces and sanctioned by arbitrary layoffs.
While waves of such protests had already taken place throughout the Ahmadinejad presidency, President Rouhani’s stance against labour rights and a decent minimum wage had only exacerbated the situation. Over the course of 2017, pensioners and teachers staged many protests against unpaid pensions and low salaries – yet their concerns were ignored by the authorities. The December 7 Student Day saw a wave of university protests with students demanding social justice and an end to political tutelage, while pointing out that the climate for activism had even become worse.
A number of key events over 2017 led popular disillusion with the regime as a whole to reach a new level. In May, after a deadly mine explosion in northern Iran, the miners’ rage descended upon President Rouhani, when angry workers attacked his armoured vehicle when he wanted to visit the site. In mid-November the heavy earthquakes shaking the country had demonstrated to all Iranians the regime’s utter neglect for their most vital needs – from the social housing, built under corrupt circumstances during the Ahmadinejad years, which had abruptly collapsed burying innumerous people under their rubble until the Rouhani administration’s hesitant reaction to provide aid to the victims that left many literally in the cold.
The ongoing rage, predicated upon by the same unaltered conditions that generated it in the first place, continues to fuel protests, which continue to pose a veritable threat to the entire elite.
Adding the final touch to those multilayered frustrations was the Rouhani administration’s announcement of its upcoming annual budget that defied the president’s bold promises to finally tackle the issue of social justice. Instead, major sums were devoted to religious foundations, run by both the regime’s conservative and reformist camps, as well as the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). This led to fierce criticism of the proposed budget on social networks. Disenchanted Rouhani voters then started a Twitter campaign against their erstwhile “bearer of hope” – with the hashtag “I regret” (Pashimanam). Thus, for many, Rouhani’s budget plan had evaporated any hope that a turn towards social justice and towards weakening authoritarian structures might be on the horizon.
The fact that the more moderate part of the Islamic republic’s elite, the reformists, who have lent their support to the centrist president, has equally been the target of the protesters’ rage is hardly surprising. Only after experiencing the massive corruption under the Ahmadinejad administration, Iranians had to soon learn about cases of corruption in the entourage of President Rouhani, the same who had taken up the cause of fighting corruption.
Over the last summer, Iranians became enraged about the elite’s nepotism, mainly in the reformist camp. The outcry was provoked by a 20 July interview in which the son of the leading reformist politician Mohammad-Reza Aref credited his “good genes” for his professional success. On social media, Iranians identified more cases of such “Aqazadeh” whose lucrative jobs were due to their father’s position in the system. On the one hand, this further undermined the tarnished reputation of the reformists, making clear that they were clearly part of the ruling elite and not on the side of the people they pretended to represent. On the other, the structuring wall erected after the revolution between regime insiders (khodi), who enjoyed access to state resources and privileges, and outsiders (qeyr-e khodi), seemed to be insurmountable for most Iranians.
All these developments over the past weeks and months came on the back of increased social frustration – certainly an important factor in any uprising – during the past five years of the Rouhani presidency as economic expectations remained unfulfilled. It is true that under Rouhani, Iran has seen its GDP grow again, at around five percent. Yet, economic growth as such is not a reliable indicator of socioeconomic development. Crucially, this growth has not been inclusive, that is, its dividends have not been distributed equally. Rather than benefiting larger sections of the population, merely the elite has enriched itself. For instance, the partial revitalisation of trade and investment with the outside world has almost exclusively benefitted the IRGC’s and the Supreme Leader’s economic empires. Given the Islamic Republic’s political-economic structures where the private sector only plays a marginal role, this lopsided outcome hardly came as a surprise – but is still discomforting. Finally, under Rouhani poverty and income inequality, especially in smaller cities, have risen.
In other words, in contrast to Rouhani’s promises, barely anything trickled down onto the general population. Given the administration’s neoliberal leanings, its economic policies heavily relied on austerity. The latter together with security formed the two constant pillars of Rouhani’s budget allocations. This neoliberal-authoritarian mix has neither alleviated the socioeconomic misery of Iranians, nor weakened authoritarian structures.
Structurally, the ongoing social misery, as well as the political system’s autocratic and repressive nature, have long formed the dual and intertwined core of a regime who had monopolised economic and political power in its own hands. Today, almost half of the Iranian population persevere around the poverty line – which tellingly stands above the official minimum wage. Officially, every eighth is unemployed; among the youth one in four also is – in reality, the real figures should be much higher. It was precisely this impoverished youth in their 20s who were the drivers of the uprising. According to estimates, 40 percent of the youth are unemployed.
All this is only a preliminary account of factors I deem important to consider. As with all such almost on-the-spot analysis of ongoing social phenomena, the insights presented here can only be tentative and non-exhaustive. Yet, what I present here for debate is that the dual evil of Rouhani’s neoliberal economic policies and the Islamic republic’s authoritarianism has created this new level of discontent fuelling the uprising. Because of that nefarious combination, I would argue, such an eruption was merely a matter of time.
Almost precisely seven years after the start of the Arab Spring, people from similar social backgrounds and with similar socioeconomic and political demands boldly took to the streets, shaking the very foundations of yet another four-decade-old autocracy in the Middle East. Importantly, their hopes have been belied time and again by both sections of Iran’s establishment, conservative and reformist, as reflected in many protest slogans. A much-needed third way can only materialise when those factions permit for the emergence of a political alternative that Iranians have been deprived of since the inception of the Islamic republic with its exclusively Islamist political establishment.
The wave of protests might have waned now a week after it started, due to repression and the lack of support of the reform-oriented section of the middle class. Yet the ongoing rage, predicated upon by the same unaltered conditions that generated it in the first place, continues to fuel protests, posing a veritable threat to the entire elite. Ironically it seems, once assuming power to represent the neglected interests of the “oppressed” (mostazafan), the same turned into “outsiders” (qeyr-e khodi) have now come to haunt the Islamic Republic’s very destiny.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial policy.