Analysis: Here is how to beat ISIL in Iraq

One of the last moves Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abbadi made, before his visit this week to Washington DC, was to retire 300 plus Iraqi defence ministry officers. According to a statement issued by the prime minister’s office, this move was  part of the restructuring of the Iraqi army to make it more effective in confronting threats facing Iraq’s national security.

On Monday, a Pentagon report suggested that ISIL has lost control of “25-30 percent” of the territory it holds in Iraq after sustained US-led coalition air strikes and an Iraqi offensive.

Both the Iraqi PM’s move and the Pentagon’s assessment raise questions about the Iraqi government’s strategy to defeat ISIL. Five Iraqi political and military analysts speak to Al Jazeera about the best strategy to defeat ISIL.

A joint Iraqi army, Shia militias, Sunni tribes and Kurdish Peshmerga forces, backed by the US-coalition air strikes may be able to beat ISIL and reclaim major cities lost to the group in 2013.

But a military victory over ISIL is unlikely to address the larger problem of ending Sunni Arabs’ exclusion and reintegrate them into the Iraqi state. Sunni political and tribal leaders who are collaborating with the Shia-led government represent just a small percentage of the community and there is simply no getting around the fact that when the dust of this war settles, Iraq’s Sunni-dominated provinces will still have the vote.

To avoid a relapse, Iraq needs a much larger effort than the Shia-led government or the outside world have so far pledged. The US-backed plan to create a mostly Sunni National Guard to police the Sunni areas and set up a more inclusive government fell short of the mark.

The problem of the disputed areas including the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, captured by Kurdish forces during the turmoil initiated by the ISIL onslaught last year, should also be peacefully resolved and the Arab population be allowed to return to their homes.

Therefore, a viable, effective and comprehensive strategic road map for national healing, peace maintaining, reconciliation and state building is required. Iraq’s three main communities should be encouraged and even pushed to make such an effort.  

In this case, a historic compromise has to be found in order for all the communities to subdue competing sectarian and ethnic resentments, forestall the escalation of the conflict, and fend off the break up of Iraq.

To help secure the long-term stability of Iraq and reunite its people, such a proposal would need to go beyond the immediate communal and regional agendas. It would have to be a genuinely grand bargain for a new Iraq.

In 2009, I personally proposed a blueprint to former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and other Iraqi leaders for a historic deal that would allow the rival communities to put their political, sectarian and ethnic cleavages aside, abandon their past prejudices and seize the chance for national reconciliation.

In the present circumstances, I find the historic compromise an approach that can mark a break with Iraq’s present dilemma and the tragedies of its recent past.

Shia Muslims should make an offer the Kurds and Sunni cannot refuse. The Kurds should stop exploiting the Shia-Sunni divide to advance their independence agenda and commit themselves to address the challenges of building a better and shared future.

Sunnis should also shelve unrealistic demands and accept a generous autonomy that would link them with the Shia Muslims and Kurds in developing a national identity broad enough to give them equal power in the country.

Significant progress against ISIL has been made. Tikrit is the first major urban centre where ISIL had consolidated its control, to be recaptured by Baghdad. There is also little question that the trend will continue. ISIL thrived on the weakness of its enemies. 

As those forces regroup and reorganise themselves, ISIL will not be able to withstand so much pressure and will eventually be forced to withdraw from all major urban centres in Iraq. 

Having said that, Baghdad continues to face a number of major challenges. The first is that it does not

control many of the actors that are supposedly fighting on its side. Various militias and other armed groups are participating in the fighting and do not answer to any centralised form of command. 

There was a plan to allow local fighters to control Tikrit after it was retaken from ISIL. Thousands of local officers had been gathering and preparing to put that plan into action for a period of months.

And yet, when Tikrit was finally recaptured from ISIL, irregular militias and other unidentified individuals moved into the city and looted much of the town. Many homes and shops were burned. Baghdad’s plan failed and it was powerless to remedy the situation. 

Ultimately, Baghdad has sufficient tools to remedy this situation. Despite a budgetary crisis, it controls the purse strings which gives it significant leverage over the groups on the ground. 

Baghdad’s other major problem is its communication strategy. The war against ISIL depends in large part on communicating the right message to Iraqis and to a broader audience. Baghdad is conscious of this but is struggling to cope. 

It has even unnecessarily exacerbated the problem by putting out statements that are clearly contradicted by the facts. Baghdad claimed that all irregular fighters had withdrawn from Tikrit, but people in the city confirm that many, possibly even thousands, still remain.

Also, although major fighting in Tikrit ended some time ago, the city’s residents have no clarity on when they are likely to return. The government has not been informing people, most likely because it still does not have a real plan of its own.