Leonid Ragozin

In fact, it may cause Rus­sians to ral­ly be­hind their pres­i­dent.

Amid prepa­ra­tions for a Russ­ian of­fen­sive and a Ukrain­ian coun­terof­fen­sive, var­i­ous sce­nar­ios for the war ap­pear like­ly.

Since 2014, the con­flict in Ukraine has been tight­ly linked to Putin’s fear of an op­po­si­tion-led chal­lenge to his rule.

Putin does not have much to lose from en­gag­ing in peace ne­go­ti­a­tions, but Ze­len­skyy does.

The Krem­lin has de­cid­ed to take the risk of a so­cial back­lash to en­sure its own sur­vival.

De­spite many set­backs, Rus­sia made some progress with re­gards to the of­fi­cial­ly de­clared goals of its war on Ukraine.

The in­va­sion can bring the down­fall of Putin’s regime – but it can also give him ex­act­ly what he wants.

Amid botched West­ern poli­cies, pro-democ­ra­cy Rus­sians do not see post-Maid­an Ukraine as a role mod­el.

Mak­ing par­al­lels with the USSR in the 1930s can­not help ex­plain Putin’s Rus­sia.

The US-Russ­ian ten­sions over Ukraine re­flect the de­fi­cien­cies of the US strat­e­gy in the post-So­vi­et space.